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Frontex
An Inside View
By Gen. Brig. Ilkka Laitinen Gen. Brig. Ilkka Laitinen Gen. Brig. Ilkka Laitinen Gen. Brig. Ilkka Laitinen Gen. Brig. Ilkka Laitinen*
Frontex’ tasks Frontex’ tasks Frontex’ tasks Frontex’ tasks Frontex’ tasks
Frontex’ task, in short, is the effective implementation of
integrated border management. The concept emerged
after the sudden shock of 11 September 2001,7 yet it was
given a different interpretation by the various institutions
involved. The Commission, on the one hand, saw an
opportunity for gradually introducing an independent
European border guard which was to be funded by the
Community budget.8 The Member States, on the other, did
not hide their scepticism towards the project and launched
a more modest and intergovernmental counterproposal.
The 2006 JHA Council finally defined integrated border
management as a concept consisting of:
a) border control,
b) prevention of cross-border crime,
c) the four-tier access control model,
d) inter-agency cooperation, and
e) political and legislative coherence.9
The Agency’s tasks can be classified as both “operational
cooperation and coordination” and “capacity building by
training, research and development”.10
With reference to the
cooperation and coordin-
ation in the field, Frontex’s
tasks include the setting up
of joint operations, technical
support to Member States,
return cooperation, and
facilitation of cooperation
with third countries and
international organisations.11 However, the execution of
these tasks is made difficult due to the voluntary character
of Frontex’ projects, including third country cooperation.
Yet, there is room for optimism for two reasons. Firstly, the
Agency’s institutional makeup involves all national border
control chiefs,12 which greatly enhances trust building and
information exchange among the Member States and
On 24 September, EIPA was honoured with a visit by Frontex’ executive director, Gen. Brig. Ilkka
Laitinen, as guest speaker in a three-day seminar on European Union migration law and
policies.1 Before his current position, Laitinen was already an often-asked expert in the field of
border management. During his career with the Finnish border guards – where he earned his
rank – he chaired a host of multinational projects and advised several Council presidencies. In
2003 he became director of the EU Risk Analysis Centre, soon to be followed by his appointment
in Warsaw at Frontex. Notwithstanding his frequent involvement in highly sensitive political
issues, Laitinen stresses he considers himself a practitioner and has no intention of changing
that.2
 A budget of €72 million,
makes Frontex an agency
of “medium calibre”.
A brief introduction to Frontex A brief introduction to Frontex A brief introduction to Frontex A brief introduction to Frontex A brief introduction to Frontex
Frontex was officially established in 2004 with an eye on the
efficient implementation of the acquis concerning border
management.3 The agency currently commands a staff of
some 190 persons – many of whom have a law enforcement
background – and a budget of €72 million, which makes
Frontex an agency of “medium calibre” in comparison with
its sister organisations. The Agency’s legal bases, Arts.
62(2) (a) & 66 EC, call for the adoption of common policies
with regard to the external borders and intra-Community
cooperation, respectively. However, whereas the Agency’s
formal roots lie in the first pillar, it is naturally expected to
consult closely with the relevant third pillar institutions and
agencies.4 It is also interesting to note that roughly 70
members of its staff are seconded national experts, which
shows the close contact of the Agency with the Member
States. Similarly, a close look at its founding Regulation
reveals that the Member States have certainly not loosened
their grip on their national prerogative, border management.
The Agency was designed to “facilitate and render more
effective the application of existing and future Community
measures”.5 One does not need to be thoroughly acquainted
with the workings of the EU
to realise the potential for
conflicts with the various
national border manage-
ment organisations. The
latter concern is underlined
by the fact that – notwith-
standing a non-obstruction
clause6 – there is no legal
obligation for the participating states to participate actively
in joint programmes. Thus, Frontex finds itself in a highly
interesting position with many opportunities, as well as
challenges.
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Frontex. Secondly, it is financially independent, which
allows it to provide positive incentives for participating
countries. Special emphasis should be given to the Agency’s
involvement in return operations, which can be classified as
“a very important and integral part of the whole chain of
border control”.13 Even though the Agency’s role is somewhat
limited by its founding Regulation – not the least by the lack
of executive power – its budgetary independence provides
a powerful tool for coordination.
As for the capacity building aspect of Frontex’ activities,
its main tasks include risk analysis, training and processing
of research and equipment.14 The Agency’s core task,
which is to deliver analytical
products, goes hand in hand
with Mr. Laitinen’s qualities
as former Director of the EU
Risk Analysis Centre. Two
main products are delivered
on a regular basis: the
Annual Risk Assessment
(ARA) and the Semi-Annual
Risk Assessment (SARA). The
former is intended to give a
mid-term overview to the
Commission of what the
specific needs are of the
respective border Member
States. The latter gives a
detailed overview regarding
specific target countries. Other risk assessments are tailored
to the specifics of, for instance, a joint action.
Additionally, another capacity building activity for Frontex
is the training of border guards across Europe. Currently,
€6.5 million has been allocated to this sector and a network
of nine academies has been set up in order to educate new
border guards. An important component of this activity is
the Common Core Curriculum, which is part of the
endeavour to apply a single unified border management
policy to the external borders of the European Union. The
latter has already been implemented by all Schengen
states. To further promote innovation in process, Frontex
maintains regular contacts with developers of relevant
technology and attempts to channel practitioners’ views.15
Recent developments Recent developments Recent developments Recent developments Recent developments
Since Frontex’s foundation, its tasks have not changed
drastically. Nevertheless, taking into consideration the very
broad mission statement, the
interpretation of those tasks
and the adherence tools are
not static. Hence, in July 2007
the Council amended the
founding Regulation to
include the Rapid Border
Intervention Team (RABIT)
mechanism.16 The amend-
ment enlarged the already
existing authority to technic-
ally support Member States
that request so.17 The Agency
may now draw up an expert
pool, consisting of national
experts which may be deployed upon approval of the
Director General. The degree of commitment has also
been stepped up by suggesting an obligation to contribute.
“Member States shall make the border guards available for
deployment at the request of the Agency, unless they are
faced with an exceptional situation”.18 In addition, the
executive powers of guest officers are also governed by the
amending Regulation, thus preventing overlapping
jurisdictions. All the same, joint missions are still governed
by the host Member State and consequently Frontex merely
contributes to the coordination and the financing of the
mission.
A further development, though not as institutionalised
as the former, is the continuous contact that Frontex
establishes with neigh-
bouring and third countries.
The 2006 JHA Council
clearly favoured such an
approach since it included
these activities in the defini-
tion of integrated border
management.19 It should be
pointed out, however, that
Frontex’ legal basis falls
under the first pillar and thus
no solid authorisation can
be found in the Treaty for
such actions. Alternatively,
the founding Regulation
2007/2004 states that “the
Agency may cooperate with
the authorities of third countries competent in matters
covered by this Regulation”.20 When asked what the legal
basis for third country interaction is, Mr. Laitinen confirmed
that the Regulation is the correct legal basis but added that
Frontex policy has to comply with other EU policies, and in
particular with external relations. In practice, such
cooperation thus consists of “purely technical arrange-
ments” such as exchange of information and experiences
as well as training cooperation. Consequently, all references
to politics have to be removed when drafting documents for
cooperation. The Agency has so far concluded working
arrangements with Russia, Ukraine, Switzerland, Croatia
and Moldova and an agreement with Georgia is under
way.
Challenges Challenges Challenges Challenges Challenges
Arguably, Frontex has already achieved more than most
critics had anticipated. Yet, a number of concerns remain
and some of which may
prove to be unsolvable. The
most frequently voiced of
these is most likely the
human rights concern. The
post-11 September exper-
ience has given a powerful
boost to the security camp
but privacy concerns remain
real. Already at an early
stage, the European Parlia-
ment and various NGOs
expressed their opposition
to what they consider to be
an extension of “Fortress
Europe”. Frontex uses financial conditionality towards its
partners in order to uphold human rights. However, this
The Agency’s tasks can be
classified as “operational
cooperation and
coordination” and “capacity
building by training,
research and
development”.
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€6.5 million has been
allocated to training and
a network of nine
academies has been set up
in order to educate new
border guards.
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argument somewhat weakens, when one considers the low
degree of transparency towards the European Parliament.
Note, for instance, that whereas the European Parliament
was involved in the setting up of Frontex, it does not receive
any information other than that related to its finances.21
In Mr. Laitinen’s point of view, there has to be a clear
distinction between politics and his tasks as a practitioner,
as he described himself. Yet, the Director General’s rank
with the Finnish border guards suggests a certain degree of
servitude to policy-makers. Nevertheless, it cannot be
denied that regarding Frontex this is partially true as the
Agency possesses an independent financial power over
missions, as well as for the deployment of the RABIT
mechanism. But how can a practitioner retain an amount
of power when he comes under political pressure? Whilst
Mr. Laitinen’s answer naturally included that “the aim is to
keep it as practical and non-political as possible”, he
acknowledged the potential difficulties “in a situation where,
for instance, Italy, Germany and France have made it clear
that it could be wise to deploy”.22 Frontex’s great reliance
on existing national structures – embodied by the seconded
national experts and the Management board – could have
a great effect on the Agency’s functioning in case of such
a conflict. It is clear that such conflicts have already arisen
when Member States criticise the good operation of Frontex:
“When there are good days, it is Member States’
responsibility and when the bad days come, then, the
responsibility is with Frontex”, said Mr. Laitinen.23
The Director General’s biggest concern, however,
seemed to have been of a more pragmatic nature. For, an
Agency like his, he argued, it cannot be expected to operate
according to the same rules and procedures as all other
European Institutions. Even though Frontex is already an
Agency that is quite independent from the Commission, Mr.
Laitinen asked for more flexibility and autonomy. The risk
of bureaucratisation by applying standard rules to Frontex
has been pointed out by a range of authors. Additionally,
the Agency has been faced until now with linguistic problems.
Even if it is English in practice, Frontex’ working language
is not given by formal legislation, which thus may result in
an increased bureaucratic burden.24
Finally, Frontex has not been given any direct operational
power: i.e. it must always rely on other parties for the final
implementation of its programs. Thus, the question arises
whether Frontex has sufficient leverage to trigger these
actors in following its lead. “If the Member States are willing
to participate in these exercises and to deploy their assets,”
Mr. Laitinen declared, ”there is no need to have this kind of
equipment itself”.25 If the Member States prefer to allocate
resources to the EU level, he added, that might pose some
legal problems but solve many practical issues. The European
Border Surveillance System (EUROSUR), focusing initially
on the southern and eastern external borders of the EU,26
though currently in a preliminary phase, has been explained
by some as a move in that direction.27
Concluding remarks Concluding remarks Concluding remarks Concluding remarks Concluding remarks
How do we proceed? Frontex finds itself in an extremely
interesting position with many opportunities, including
human rights and democratic concerns. Certainly, the
agency has benefited from the ruling public opinion of the
post-11 September world, which served as policy window
for the securitisation of the EU. Here it is interesting,
however, that Frontex’ primordial tasks lie with economic
migration and not with border security in a more military
sense. Will this political climate hold still, or, will we see a
return to a more moderate approach, favouring economic
interests and human rights? As much as the Director
General of Frontex attempts to stay clear of these questions,
he is inevitably caught by these questions.
Las Palmas, 11 October 2006 – Ilkka Laitinen visiting HERA.
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